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Case No. 20100080-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Antonie Darnell Harris,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for the lesser included offense of assault,
a Class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3I02(3)(b) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant asserts that he timely raised a Batson objection in a sidebar
conference, which the trial court erroneously rejected. Alternatively, he claims that
the trial court plainly erred and that trial counsel was ineffective for not timely
resolving the matter. He also claims that despite the trial court's ultimate implicit
denial of the objection, the trial court erred and his trial counsel was ineffective
because no detailed ruling was entered.
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Issue 1. (a) Did Defendant waive a Batson objection when he passed the jury
for cause before raising an objection, and then allowed the jury to be sworn and the
remainder of the venire to be dismissed before the objection was resolved? (b) May
Defendant circumvent this waiver by claiming plain error and ineffective assistance
of counsel?
Standard of Review. Waiver is determined as a matter of law. State v. Rosa-Re,
2008 UT 53, \ 6,190 P.3d 1259; State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, If 11,140 P.3d 1219). To
preserve a Batson objection, the objection must be raised and resolved "before the
jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is dismissed/7 Rosa-Re, 2008
UT 53, Tf^f 8,13. The trial court has an "obligation" to timely resolve a Batson
objection, but "defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to notify the court
that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. Failure
to do so, or acquiescing in the court's inaction . . . constitute^] a waiver of the
original objection." Id. at f ^f 13,14.
2. If the merits are considered, has Defendant established reversible error? *
Standard of Review. When the issue is preserved, a trial court's denial of a
Batson violation is reviewed for clear error. State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,120,994 P.2d
1

The State reverses the order of Defendant's arguments to place the
procedural argument before the substantive. The State's Point I responds to
Defendant's Point II, and conversely, the State's Point II responds to Defendant's
Point I.
2
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177. Recognizing the possibility of waiver, Defendant alternatively seeks review of
the merits under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish plain
error, Defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993). To establish counsel ineffectiveness, Defendant must "(i) identify
specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable
professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or omission and
under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel's error
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable
probability" of a more favorable outcome.

Id. at 1225 (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 & 694 (1984)) (other citations omitted). This
prejudice standard is "equivalent to the harmfulness test [courts] apply in
determining plain error." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225 (citations omitted).
Under any of the three standards, reversal of Defendant's conviction is not
justified unless Defendant establishes, at a minimum, that his Batson objection had
merit, that is, that the prosecutor's strike was exercised solely for a racially
discriminatory purpose in violation of equal protection.

3
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), prohibits a party from purposefully
discriminating by striking a juror solely on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Add. D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In January 2008, Defendant was charged with aggravated assault of Sara
Michel (Count I) and misdemeanor assault of his cohabitant Amber Wardle (Count
II). Rl-3. The Salt Lake Defender Association (LDA) was assigned to represent
Defendant, but LDA subsequently withdrew when Defendant retained private
counsel, Stephen R. McCaughey. R6-7,10,44.
A one-day jury trial was held in October 2009. R187-89. The venire was
questioned and some members were dismissed for cause. R224:l-22; R158 (Add. A).
The parties then silently exercised their respective peremptory jury strikes. Id.
During this process, the judge read aloud to the venire an excerpt from an article
entitled "Do You Swear That You Will Well and Truly Try?" R224:22-28. When the
judge finished, the parties still had not completed their strikes, so the judge
continued to briefly explain the jury selection process to the venire. R224:28-29. See
Add. A.
After the parties completed their strikes, but before the selected jurors were
announced, the court asked defense counsel, //[F]or the record, Mr. McCaughey, you
4
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did pass the jury for cause?" R224:29. Defense counsel replied, "I think we need to
approach for a minute," and immediately added, "Oh, we do pass for cause, yes."
Id. See Add. A.
During the ensuing sidebar conference, defense counsel stated his intention to
challenge one prosecution strike under Batson:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The concern (inaudible) is Juror No. 3 is struck
by the State (inaudible) ability (inaudible) she needs to justify
(inaudible).
THE COURT: All right, do you have a reason for that?
PROSECUTOR: Yeah, (inaudible).
THE COURT: Why don't we put that on the record during the break?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, I just wanted to inform you (inaudible).
R224:29-30. The sidebar conference then ended. See Add. B.
The court announced the names of the selected jurors. R224:30-31. The
remainder of the venire, including the allegedly wrongfully stricken juror, was
dismissed and left the courtroom. R224:30. Defendant did not object. The selected
jurors were then sworn. R224:31. Again, Defendant did not object. See Add. B.
During a subsequent recess, the court stated, "Mr. McCaughey did ask to
approach the bench on a Batson [cjhallenge," and the court invited defense counsel
to "make that on the record now." R224:32. Defense counsel then articulated his
Batson objection for the first time:

5
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[Bjased on the [Sjtate's taking off Juror No. 3, [Jonathan Chau], who
clearly was the only minority on the jury, as I looked through . . . my
notes on his answers, there's nothing in there that would indicate any
reason to take him off the jury other than the fact that he was 27 years
old and was obvious... of the Asian race and so I think the State has to
justify why they took that person off the jury. 2
R224:32-33. See Add. C.
The court asked the prosecutor to explain her strike.

The prosecutor

responded that she struck Chau based on his lack of attentiveness:
[W]hen I was watching [Chau] during the time that [the judge] was
reading the story to the jurors, he was not paying attention. He kept
putting his head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when
someone doesn't want to pay attention. I also noted in my notes that
he kept looking at me funny and so any time I get a bad feeling from a
juror and if they're not paying attention, initially I was going to leave
him on and then he just wasn't paying attention. He has to pay
attention during the jury trial.
I had concerns about (inaudible) Bunting as well but the defense had
struck her. I didn't know if she would have any problems with her or
anything but . . . the defense struck her as number 4, but she was
actually paying attention and listening to what [the court] had to say
and Jonathan was not paying attention.
R224:33. See Add. C.

2

Jonathan's last name is spelled "Chau" (Vietnamese) on the jury list, but is
spelled "Chow" (Chinese) in the transcript. Compare R158, with R224:4 (Add. A). See
www.meaning-of-names.com/asia-and-pacific/c-names-2.asp. Chau was the fifth
juror listed, but the third juror struck by the State. R158. He was a 27-year-old fulltime university student, who did not otherwise work, was born and raised in Utah,
and was single without children. R224:4.
6
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The court confirmed that Defendant was a racial minority, but not Asian.
R224: 33-34. The court then asked defense counsel if there was "[a]nything else we
need to put on the record?" R224:34. Defense counsel suggested that Chau's actions
might not mean he was inattentive:
I guess my response to that is, it's hard for somebody to tell if
somebody is paying attention. People have different ways of paying
attention and this is a smaller room (inaudible) reading to them or
talking to them and so the fact that somebody is looking around or
something, I don't think is necessarily they're not paying attention. So
I don't think that's sufficient, but just so the record is clear.
Id. The court thanked counsel, said "all right," and recessed. Id. Defense counsel
did not ask the court to enter findings or otherwise make a more specific ruling on
the Batson objection. See Add. C.
Trial then continued. R187-98. Amber, Defendant's former girlfriend, did not
testify and the court dismissed the misdemeanor assault charge involving her
(Count II). R224:118-20. The court instructed the jury on the felony aggravated
assault charge involving Amber's friend Sara (Count I) and, at Defendant's request,
also instructed the jury on two lesser included offenses: Class A misdemeanor
assault with substantial bodily injury and Class B misdemeanor simple assault.
R224:141-42; R179-84. See Add. D. The jury found Defendant guilty of Class B
misdemeanor assault. R186.

7
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On December 18,2009, the court sentenced Defendant to 180 days in jail, but
suspended the jail sentence and placed him on probation. R195-97. Defendant
timely appealed. R201. The court of appeals subsequently certified the appeal to
this Court. See Court of Appeals Order, No. 2010080-CA, dated June 6, 2011.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his misdemeanor conviction/the facts are only briefly summarized.
In December 2007, Amber wanted her boyfriend (Defendant) to move out of
their apartment and asked her friend Sara to be with her when she told him.
R224:48-53. At the apartment, a quarrel erupted. Defendant called Sara "a slut" and
"a whore." R224:55. Sara retorted that Defendant was "a bastard and an asshole."
R224:55-56. Defendant ordered Sara to leave and followed her to the front door,
where he pushed and choked her "[h]ard enough to where [she] couldn't breathe."
R224:56,58. Sara hit Defendant, called him "the 'n' word," and said, "Let me go.
You wanted me out. I was leaving. Just let me go." R224:57-59.
Amber asked Sara to stay and Defendant "put his fist up like he was going to
hit" Amber. Id. Sara stepped between the two. Id. Defendant pushed Sara to the
floor, "jumped" on top of her, and again began choking her. He threatened, "Do
you want to die, bitch. You're going to die." Id. Sara told Amber to get help.
i

8
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R224:63. When Amber ran out of the apartment, Defendant got off Sara and chased
Amber. R224:63-64.
Defendant admitted that Sara's account of the assault was essentially true, but
claimed that she had pushed him first and, in self-defense, he grabbed her by the
throat and pushed her back. R224:123-25,129-31. Defendant admitted that he "lost
sight of... what [he] was doing" when he threw Sara to the ground and choked her
a second time. R224:125,132-33. He justified his response because: (1) the "n—"
word "instills a lot of rage in black people in general"; (2) he was bipolar and not on
medication; and (3) he was "defending himself." R224:134-35,137-38.
The police photographed Sara's visible bruises and scratches, but she required
no medical treatment. R224:65-67,78-79. At trial, a medical expert described the
general nature of the injuries depicted in the photographs. R224:109-16. The jury
did not find that the injuries were "serious" or "substantial" and acquitted
Defendant of felony aggravated assault and Class A assault with substantial bodily
injury. R179-83,186. The jury rejected Defendant's claim of self-defense and
convicted him of Class B misdemeanor assault. R180,182,186.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction or claim other trial error. He argues, nevertheless, that his conviction

9
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should be reversed because the prosecutor purposefully discriminated by striking
venire member Chau solely based on his race.
Defendant asserts that he properly preserved a Batson objection during a
sidebar conference, before the jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was
dismissed. Under well-established Utah precedent, he did not. Defendant waived
his objection by passing the jury for cause before even mentioning Batson, and by
permitting the jury to be sworn and the venire to be dismissed before the Batson
objection was argued and resolved.
Defendant alternatively argues that even if he waived his Batson objection, its
merits may be reviewed under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The
merits should not be considered, because waiver in the context of Batson precludes
plain error review. And waiver in the context of Batson should also preclude a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In any case, even if the merits are considered, Defendant fails to establish
reversible error. Defendant alleges various procedural errors in the handling of the
Batson objection. But no procedural error supports reversal of a conviction if the
underlying claim has no merit. Consequently, whether the merits are directly
reviewed or reviewed under plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel,
Defendant must, at a minimum, establish that his Batson objection had merit and
should or would have been granted. This, in turn, requires Defendant to establish
10
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that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated by striking Chau solely based on his
race. Because Defendant fails to make this showing, his claims should be rejected
and his otherwise valid conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS BATSON OBJECTION; HE SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO CIRCUMVENT THAT WAIVER BY
CLAIMING PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL ON APPEAL
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial
discrimination in jury selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Under
Batson, a party is prohibited from peremptorily striking a potential juror solely on
the basis of the juror's race; and if an opponent believes the party has purposefully
discriminated in exercising a strike, the opponent may object. See id. at 89 & 94-97.
A Batson objection, however, is not "itself a peremptory challenge, but rather
an objection to . . . [the] improper use of peremptory challenges/' State v. Valdez,
2006 UT 394 25,140 P.3d 1219 (emphasis in original) [hereafter referred to as Valdez
II\. A Batson objection thus is best understood as a claim that the selected jury is
'"improperly constituted'" in violation of equal protection. Id. (quoting Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991)). Because the objection is to the selected jury's
composition, it must be raised and resolved before jury selection is completed — that
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is, before the selected jurors are sworn and the remainder of the venire is dismissed.
See State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,113-14,190 P.3d 1259; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 44.
Defendant claims that he timely raised a Batson objection during a sidebar
conference that occurred before the jury was sworn and the venire was dismissed.
Br.Aplt. at 32-38. He also asserts that the objection was summarily rejected in the
same sidebar.

Id.

Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if he waived

consideration of his Batson claim, its merits may be reviewed under plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 38-42. Both claims lack merit.
Although Defendant in the sidebar conference indicated an intention to raise
a Batson objection, he had already passed the jury for cause. Following the sidebar
conference, but before the Batson objection was argued or resolved, Defendant
allowed the jury to be sworn and the remainder of the venire, including the
allegedly wrongfully stricken juror, to be dismissed. Only then did defense counsel
state the grounds for his Batson objection. And only then was the objection resolved.
Under well-established Utah precedent, consideration of the merits is not preserved,
but waived. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, \ 14.
In the context of Batson, waiver, like invited error, precludes plain error
review. In this context, it should also preclude a.claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Utah's "bright line" timely-raise-or-waive rule was adopted to prevent a
defendant from sandbagging and strategically planting Batson error. Id. at f % 8,13;
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Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44 & n.22. Allowing this rule to be circumvented by an
allegation of ineffectiveness would unduly benefit defendants and encourage more
sandbagging with Batson claims.
Alternatively, as discussed in Point II, even if the Batson claim is deemed
preserved or is reviewable under plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel,
Defendant fails to establish reversible error.
A, Utah's waiver rule requires that a Batson objection be raised and
resolved before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire is
dismissed.
A defendant has "the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected
pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. See also Valdez II,
2006 UT 39, ^ 13. A party is prohibited from intentionally discriminating by striking
a juror solely on the basis of race. Id. If an opponent believes that the party
exercised a strike with discriminatory intent, the opponent may object. Id.
Resolution of a Batson objection involves "an evidentiary framework similar to that
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 14.
First, the opponent of the peremptory challenges must establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the
petit jury. . . . In other words, the challenging party must produce
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred. . . . Second, once the opponent has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the
peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering neutral,
nondiscriminatory justifications for the peremptory challenges. . . .
Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the
13
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peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the
opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful
discrimination.
Id. at If 15 (citations and internal marks omitted). If the objection is granted and the
strike set aside, the wrongfully stricken juror is reinstated, unless the trial court
determines that an alternative remedy is necessary. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24;
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, If 44.
Batson protects multiple rights. It protects a litigant's right to a fairly selected
jury and also jurors' rights to be fairly considered for jury service. Valdez II, 2006 UT
39, *([ 17. Moreover, "the entire community has an interest in fair jury selection
procedures" because "[w]hen jurors are excluded pursuant to discriminatory
selection criteria, 'public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice' is
undermined." Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87). Thus, a litigant raising a Batson
objection asserts not only his own equal protection right, but also the equal
protection rights of the "wrongfully struck jurors." Id. at n.12 (citing Powers, 499
U.S. at 413-415).
To best ensure that jurors' rights are protected and that wrongfully stricken
jurors are promptly reinstated on the jury, Utah has adopted a "bright line" timelyraise-or-waive rule. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,118,12; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 38. Under
that rule, the opponent of the challenged strike —here Defendant—must clearly
articulate a Batson objection before the selected jurors are sworn and the remainder
14
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of the venire is dismissed. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^ 12. Once an objection is properly
articulated, the trial court has "an obligation to resolve" it, id. at ^f 13, but Defendant
bears the ultimate responsibility for its timely resolution:
[T] rial courts have an obligation to resolve Batson objections before the
jury is sworn and the venire dismissed. Given that the express purpose
of Batson is to correct a constitutionally deficient jury composition
before the jury is actually seated and sworn, postponing the resolution
is inappropriate.
Moreover, in the event that the trial court fails to timely resolve a
Batson objection, defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to
notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and
the venire dismissed. Failure to do so, or acquiescing in the court's
inaction, will... constitute a waiver of the original objection.
Id. at\^ 13-14. (emphasis added).
B. Defendant waived his Batson objection.
As stated, Defendant claims that he timely raised his Batson objection during
the sidebar conference before the jury was sworn and the venire was dismissed.
Br.Aplt. at 33-38. He also claims that the trial court summarily rejected the objection
during the same sidebar. Id. The record belies both assertions.
The facts here are nearly identical to those in Rosa-Re. In Rosa-Re, defense
counsel during a sidebar conference said he needed the record "to make a Batson
challenge," but he then allowed the jury to be sworn and the venire dismissed
before the objection was argued and denied. 2008 UT 53, ^

2-4. Following

conviction, Rosa-Re appealed. Id. at f 5. The court of appeals refused to consider
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the merits of the Batson claim because it was untimely under Valdez II. Id. On
certiorari review, this Court reaffirmed Utah's bright line waiver rule, but held that
it did not apply to Rosa-Re, because Valdez II was not decided before Rosa-Re's trial.
Id. at Tf 112-15. Significantly, however, in this case, unlike in Rosa-Re, Utah's timelyraise-or-waive rule was firmly established at the time of Defendant's trial.
In this case, the parties had just completed exercising their peremptory strikes
when the trial court asked defense counsel if Defendant passed the jury for cause.
Defense counsel asked for a sidebar conference, but before approaching the bench,
confirmed that the defense had no objection to the jury's composition. See Statement
of the Case at 4-5.
Although the ensuing sidebar conference was recorded, some words or
phrases are designated as inaudible. See State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113, 69 P.3d
1278 (reaffirming appellant's duty to provide adequate record for appellate review).
The existing record, nevertheless, reflects that during the sidebar, defense counsel
stated only an intention to raise a Batson objection at some point and then
immediately acquiesced in delaying argument and resolution of the objection until
after the jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was dismissed. See
Statement of the Case at 5. The record also establishes that during the sidebar, the
court asked the prosecutor only if she had a reason to support the strike, but did not
ask the prosecutor to articulate those reasons until after the jury was sworn and
16
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venire dismissed. Compare R224:29~30 {Add. B), with R224:33 {Add. C). And nothing
in the existing record suggests that the trial court actually rejected the Batson
objection during the sidebar conference, especially given the court's subsequent
invitation to defense counsel to argue the matter. Compare R224:29-30 {Add. B), with
R224:32~34 {Add. C).
Even if Defendant was trying to raise a Batson objection during the sidebar
conference, he failed. As discussed, Batson precludes purposeful discrimination in
violation of equal protection; consequently, a Batson objection must allege an actual
intent to discriminate. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,112. Here, defense counsel did not
allege that the prosecutor intentionally discriminated when she struck Chau. In the
sidebar conference, defense counsel claimed only that Chau was a minority and,
therefore, the prosecutor must explain the strike. See Statement of the Case at 5.
Batson does not impose such a blanket requirement. See Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991) (clarifying that only strikes exercised with discriminatory
intent fall within Batson, but not strikes that produce "a racially disproportionate
impact"). And although a similarly minimal statement by defense counsel was
considered "substantively adequate" to raise a Batson objection in Rosa-Re, this
Court warned that more specific articulation would be required in the future:
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[G]oing forward, the proponent of a Batson challenge must clearly
articulate that a Batson objection is being made and that the peremptory
strike was purposefully used to discriminate on the basis of race or
gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Rose-Re, 2008 UT 53, f 12 (emphasis in original).
In any case, even if a Batson objection was articulated in the sidebar
conference, Defendant waived his initial objection when he simultaneously passed
the jury for cause and then, before the objection was argued or resolved, allowed the
jury to be sworn and the remainder of the venire to be dismissed. See Rosa-Re, 2008
UT 53, If 1344; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44.
C.

Defendant's waiver precludes plain error review.
Defendant claims that even if he waived his Batson objection, its merits may

nevertheless be reviewed for plain error.

See Br.Aplt. at 38-42. According to

Defendant, the trial court plainly erred when it did not resolve the Batson objection
in a timely manner. 3 Id. at 40-41.
As discussed, Utah recognizes that a defendant's failure to timely raise a
Batson objection and his acquiescence in the trial court's failure to timely resolve the
objection constitutes "waiver of the original objection/' Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^f 14.

3

Defendant also claims that the court erred in not entering detailed findings.
See Br.Aplt. at 25-32. This point is discussed in Point 11(C).
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Waiver in the context of Batson — like invited error—precludes plain error review
See Bayless, 201 F.3d at 127 (recognizing that "waiver—whether express or implied"
precludes appellate review of waived claim); Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^f 14 (reaffirming
that invited error precludes plain error review); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220
(Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committed the error.").
Here, defense counsel's affirmative actions and implicit representations not
only waived his Batson claim, but also invited any alleged error. See Rosa-Re, 2008
UT 53, Tf 14 (holding that regardless of trial court's error, defendant has "absolute
obligation" to actively seek timely resolution of Batson objection). After the parties
exercised their peremptory strikes, defense counsel affirmatively passed the jury for
cause, thereby indicating that the defense had no objection to the selected jury's

4

Waiver is the "renunciation [of a claim or right] —whether expressly through
words or implicitly through behavior." United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116,127
(2nd Cir. 2000). The related concept of invited error occurs when "counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no
objection to the proceedings." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14, 128 P.3d 1171
(citations and internal marks omitted). The invited error doctrine precludes a party
from "tak[ing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial
court into committing the error." Id. at 15 (internal marks omitted). Rosa-Re relied
on Winfield's invited error doctrine in clarifying that a defendant's acquiescence in
delayed resolution of a Batson objection "waives" the objection. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,
114.
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composition. Defense counsel next minimally referred to Batson during the sidebar
conference, but simultaneously agreed that full consideration of the objection could
be delayed. And when the court subsequently swore the jury and dismissed the
venire before resolving the objection, defense counsel did not object, but acquiesced
in the delayed consideration of the objection. See Statement of the Case at 4-6. These
actions and representations clearly signaled the trial court that Defendant had no
problem with the composition of the selected jury and no desire to have Chau, the
stricken juror, reinstated but was interested only in ensuring that "the record was
clear" that a Batson objection was raised. R224:34. Under the precedent cited above,
such planted error precludes plain error review.
D. Defendant's waiver should also preclude his ineffectiveness claim.
Defendant alternatively claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
waiving the Batson objection. See Br.Aplt at 42-45. Consideration of Defendant's
ineffectiveness claim would undermine the purpose and policy behind Utah's
bright-line waiver rule.
The procedure for resolving a Batson objection is designed to "'encourage[ ]
prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial
disruption of the jury selection process/" Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44 (quoting
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162,172-73 (2005)). "A Batson violation can only be
remedied without substantially disrupting the jury selection process if it is brought
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before the venire is dismissed/' Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 44. "If a Batson violation is
found before the venire is dismissed, [it] can be remedied simply by reinstating the
stricken juror/' Id. But "[o]nce the venire has been dismissed... a sustained Batson
challenge will require the trial judge" to go to considerable trouble, including
possibly calling "an entirely new venire . . . [or] declaring a mistrial." Id. As this
Court noted in Valdez II, there is "no legitimate reason to sanction such an inefficient
use of judicial time and resources, or to allow such a burden to be imposed on the
parties." Id. More importantly, as recognized in Valdez II, allowing "a Batson
challenge to proceed after the venire has been dismissed . . . sanction[s] abuse":
If such a result were allowed a party would be able to delay raising a
Batson challenge until it determined whether it approved of the
selected jury. Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of judicial
economy and procedural fairness.
Id. In short, delay in raising and resolving a Batson objection impermissibly allows a
defendant to plant error and "test his fortunes with the first jury," only to seek the
benefit of "a second round in the event of a conviction." Id. at n.22. For these
reasons, Utah adopted a strict timely-raise-or-waive rule. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,
1 ! 8 & 14; Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, «ff 26 & 43-44,
Allowing a defendant who has waived a Batson claim to bypass that waiver
by claiming ineffectiveness on appeal eviscerates this rule. As Valdez II noted, a
defendant—and hence defense counsel—has every incentive to plant possible
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reversible error by delaying or minimally raising a Batson objection. Indeed, as is
apparent in this case, a defendant may often have no real interest in the timely
resolution of a Batson objection because, whatever its resolution, the defendant is
benefitted.

For example, here, the defense expressed satisfaction with the

composition of the selected jury, allowed that jury to be sworn, and allowed the
remainder of the venire, including the allegedly improperly stricken juror, to be
dismissed. In so doing, Defendant and his counsel strategically set up a win-win
situation.
If the trial court had considered the untimely Batson objection and granted it,
mistrial would have been the only available remedy because Chau was no longer
present and the jury had already been sworn. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, Tf 44. A
mistrial would have presumptively benefitted Defendant by further delaying his
trial, raising the possibility that Sara, like Amber, might not subsequently appear
and dismissal be compelled. See Statement of the Case at 7. Conversely, if the
untimely objection had been denied, as occurred here, trial would simply proceed
with a jury that Defendant had already selected and approved. But he would now
have the advantage of possible planted error in an otherwise pristine record. And
even if the trial court had refused to consider the untimely objection, the trial again
would have simply proceeded with the jury that Defendant had already selected
and approved. In sum, unless Defendant affirmatively wanted the allegedly
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wrongfully stricken juror to serve —which is not the case here because he allowed
Chau to be dismissed —Defendant faced no disincentive for delaying the Batson
objection, but for the strict timely-raise-or-waive rule.
Permitting an ineffectiveness claim eviscerates this disincentive and
encourages sandbagging. A substantive Batson violation is unlike other errors.
Under Batson, if an actual equal protection violation is established, automatic
reversal results without regard to the impact of that violation on the verdict. See
Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446,1455-56 (2009) (distinguishing between ordinary
error in loss of peremptory strike and structural error that occurs from actual Batson
violation); United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952,955-56 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that all federal circuits addressing issue have concluded actual Batson violation
constitutes structural error); State v. Pliarris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993)
(recognizing that actual Batson violation requires automatic reversal), cert, denied,
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Defendant goes farther. He argues that even a procedural error in the
handling of a Batson objection compels automatic reversal. See Br.Aplt. at 25-32,42 &
44-45. He claims that if counsel was deficient in waiving the Batson objection,
prejudice need not be shown because Batson constitutes structural error. See id. at
44-45. The merits of this argument will be discussed in Point II. But its significance
here is that it demonstrates the danger of allowing an ineffectiveness claim to
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supplant Batson waiver: that an otherwise valid conviction could be overturned due
to counsel's deficient mishandling of a Batson objection, even if no violation of either
the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendment actually occurred. See Point 11(A).
In sum, Defendant's waived Batson claim should not be reviewed under either
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
II.
ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE MERITS ARE CONSIDERED,
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH REVERSIBLE ERROR
But even if the merits of Defendant's claim are considered, Defendant has not
established reversible error. Whether the merits are reviewed directly or under
plain error and counsel ineffectiveness, Defendant at a minimum must establish a
substantive Batson error. That is, Defendant must establish that his Batson objection
had merit and thus should or would have been granted, if properly handled.
A, Defendant must establish a substantive Batson claim to justify
reversal of his conviction.
Batson is not violated unless the Fourteenth Amendment is violated, meaning
that the selected jury is "improperly constituted" in violation of equal protection.
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 25. As applied here, equal protection is not violated unless
the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in striking Chau solely based on
race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Accord Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60; Valdez II, 2006
UT 39, mf 13-15. Proof of a substantive Batson violation mandates automatic
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reversal without a showing that the violation prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
See cases cited, supra, at 23. Consequently, only if Defendant establishes that he
preserved a meritorious Batson objection and that the trial court erroneously denied
it, is he entitled to reversal of his conviction.
Defendant nevertheless claims that he is also entitled to reversal of his
conviction if he establishes either that the trial court or trial counsel procedurally
erred in resolving his Batson objection, regardless of the objection's actual merit or
its impact on the outcome of trial. See Br.Aplt. at 38-45. But even if Defendant
establishes that the trial court erred and counsel was deficient in their resolution of
the Batson objection, reversal is not warranted unless Defendant also establishes, at
minimum, that the mishandled objection had merit—that, but for the procedural
errors, the objection should and would have been granted.5

5

Separate from plain error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not
fully ruling or entering findings. See Br.Aplt. at 25-32. This argument is addressed
in Point 11(C). A lack of Batson findings, however, does not compel reversal, but
only requires a remand for entry of findings. See, e.g.United States v. Rutledge, 648
F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding for entry of credibility findings, because
when "an evidentiary gap at step three [exists], the ultimate Batson issue cannot be
resolved without a remand"); State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 17, 41 P.3d 1153
(remanding for entry of additional Batson findings, where trial court's ruling was
"both incomplete and conclusory"); Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465 (same); People v.
Martinez, 740 N.E.2d 1185,1189 (111. App. 2000) (same). A remand is not required if,
as here, the basis of the trial court's ruling is otherwise apparent from the record.
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 n.6 (Utah 1991).
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Plain error requires Defendant to establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/'
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Here, as explained, defense counsel invited any error,
which precludes plain error review. See discussion, supra, at 18-20.
To establish that defense counsel was ineffective in inviting error, Defendant
must: "(i) identify specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard
of reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or
omission and under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for counsel's error, there is a
reasonable probability" of a more favorable outcome. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225 (citing
Strickland v. Washington,, 466 U.S. 668,690-91 & 694 (1984)). This prejudice standard
"is equivalent to the harmfulness test [courts] apply in determining plain error." Id.
Defendant claims that he does not need to establish prejudice as required
under Strickland or plain error, because Batson constitutes structural error that
permits automatic reversal. See Br.Aplt. at 42-44. Thus, he claims that his counsel's
alleged deficiency in handling of the Batson objection alone justifies reversal of his

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conviction.6 Id.
Batson, however, does not require automatic reversal for procedural errors; it
compels reversal only for substantive equal protection violations. See Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 359-60. Moreover, unlike the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect the fairness of individual verdicts. It protects the fairness of the
jury selection process. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, | 25. Batson itself recognizes that
even if a jury is discriminatorily selected, that fact alone does not negate the validity
of the jury's verdict, because a jury's racial composition is wholly irrelevant to a fair
adjudication of the merits of a case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (reaffirming that "[a]
person's race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror") (citation and internal
marks omitted).
Some of the few cases that have addressed Batson in the context of counsel
ineffectiveness likewise recognize the near impossibility of proving a Batson

6

Defendant asserts that it is "obvious" that counsel was deficient in failing to timely
raise and resolve the Batson objection. See Br.Aplt. at 44. Defendant must prove,
however, that there is "no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy" for counsel's
decision. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). See also
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53,119,165 P.3d 1195 (recognizing strong presumption
of competency and effectiveness accorded counsel). Defendant has not met and
cannot meet this burden, given the reasons why delay benefits a defendant and,
consequently, may be strategic. See discussion, supra, at 21-23. See also State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 20-21,12 P.3d 92 (recognizing that jury selection is "more
art than science").
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violation affected the outcome of an individual trial, as required under Strickland
and plain error.

See, e.g. Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618.(7th Cir. 2011)

(discussing conflicting views of how prejudice should be assessed in ineffectiveness
claim based on Batson violation). Some courts thus allow a defendant to establish
plain error or counsel's ineffectiveness by demonstrating that the obvious error or
deficient performance resulted in the denial of a meritorious Batson claim. See, e.g.,
Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F.Supp. 782,787 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (requiring defendant who
alleges ineffectiveness to show reasonable probability that if Batson objection had
been made, it" would have been sustained and that the trial judge would have taken
curative action before the trial began"); In re Commitment of Taylor, 679 N. W.2d 893,
899-900 (Wis. App. 2004) (same); Pierce v. State, 686 S.E.2d 656, 661 (Ga. 2009)
(holding that defendant must establish not only "that trial counsel should have
raised a Batson challenge, but also that the challenge would have been successful").
The State does not concede that traditional Strickland prejudice or plain error
harmfulness is not required. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147
(2006) (" [A] violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not
'complete7 until the defendant is prejudiced."); Batiste v. State, 888 S.W.2d 9,1447
(Tex. App. 1994) (extensively discussing and concluding that ineffectiveness claim
based on Batson requires proof of traditional Strickland prejudice). Compare Johnson
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,466 (1997) (recognizing that plain error predicated on
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structural error must be analyzed under standard federal 4-part plain error test),
with State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 18 & n.2, 122 P.3d 543 (recognizing Johnson
standard, but noting that state plain error analysis is "differs slightly").
For purposes of argument, however, the State analyzes the issue under the
more liberal prejudice standard, which requires Defendant to demonstrate that the
alleged obvious errors or alleged deficient performance adversely affected the
outcome of his Batson objection. Under this standard, Defendant still must show
that his Batson objection had merit and thus should and would have been granted,
but for the alleged procedural errors. Indeed, without such a requirement, an
anomaly could result: Defendant's otherwise valid conviction could be reversed
simply because the court and counsel mishandled a non-meritorious Batson claim.
See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, \ 26,1 P.3d 546; State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34,989
P.2d 52; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48,51 (Utah 1998) (all recognizing that ineffective
assistance cannot be predicated on non-meritorious motion).
In sum, whether preserved or reviewed under plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel, reversal is not warranted unless Defendant establishes a
substantive Batson violation. As discussed below, Defendant has not established a
substantive violation.
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B. A substantive Batson violation requires proof of discriminatory
intent.
As noted, resolution of a Batson objection is a three-Step process. "[OJnce the
opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the
strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race- neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination." Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765,767 (1995). Accord State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 17,994 P.2d 177; State v.
Higginbotliam, 917 P.2d 545,547 (Utah 1996). The analysis is identical to that used in
employment discrimination cases. See Valdez II, 2006 UT 39, f 14. And "[a]s in any
equal protection case, the burden is, of course, on the defendant who alleges
discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the existence of purposeful
discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (citation and internal marks omitted).
1. Step one: the prima facie showing.
Step one of Batson analysis requires the opponent of the strike —here
Defendant—to show that "the totality of the relevant facts" supports an inference of
purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 18;
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,455 (Utah 1994). Merely alleging that a minority was
struck is insufficient; rather, Defendant must demonstrate "a strong likelihood" that
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the prosecutor purposefully discriminated in striking Chau solely based on his race.
See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457-58.
Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing either in the sidebar
conference or in his subsequent argument.

Counsel did not allege that the

prosecutor purposefully discriminated. See Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, If 12. He alleged
only that because Chau was a minority and counsel could discern no reason for his
strike, an explanation was required. See Statement oftlie Case at 5-7. Normally, a
lack of a prima facie showing justifies termination of the Batson inquiry; but in this
case, the prima facie requirement became moot once the prosecutor explained her
strike (step two).

See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, t 18.

Nevertheless, weakness in the prima facie showing may be considered in evaluating
the trial court's ultimate denial of the Batson objection (step three). See Hernandez,
500 U.S. at 369-70.
2. Step two: the explanation for the strike.
Step two of Batson analysis requires the proponent of the strike —here the
prosecutor — to provide a facially neutral explanation for the strike. See Purkett, 514
U.S. at 768-69. A general denial of discriminatory purpose is insufficient. See id. at
769. But see Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 & n.6 (recognizing that even when "a frivolous
or utterly nonsensical justification" or no explanation is offered, Batson inquiry still
proceeds to step three). The explanation should be "clear and reasonably specific"
31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and "related to the [prosecutor's] view concerning the ... case to be tried." Batson,
476 U.S. at 89, 98 n.20.

"Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the

prosecutor's explanation," the explanation is considered facially neutral as a matter
of law. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
The prosecutor's explanation, however, need not be persuasive or even
plausible in step two. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Rather the
credibility and validity of the explanation is considered only in step three, when the
trial court ultimately rules:
[In step three] implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say
that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at
step three is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate
the inquiry at step two when the race-neutral reason is silly or
superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden
of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests and never
shifts from the opponent of the strike.
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (emphasis in original). Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1f 22.
Here, the prosecutor offered a clear and reasonably specific explanation that
was related directly to this case. The prosecutor explained that she struck Chau
because he was inattentive. She explained that she had first noticed that Chau
looked at her "funny" several times, but did not decide to strike him until she
observed him "putting his head down" and not listening to the judge when the
judge was reading the jury article to the venire. The prosecutor had considered
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striking Juror Bunting, but ultimately decided to strike Chau because Bunting was
paying attention to the judge, but Chau was not. The prosecutor felt that a juror
needed to be fully attentive during court proceedings. See Statement oftlie Case at 6.
See United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
prosecutor's "concern about a juror's inattentiveness is a good reason for its
exercising a peremptory challenge"); United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211,214 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("Intuitive assumptions about a potential juror's interest and attitudes can
be acceptable as a neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge."); and United
States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904,913 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming that juror inattentiveness
is widely recognized as facially race-neutral explanation for strike).
3. Step three: the trial court's ruling.
Step three of the Batson analysis requires the trial court to determine if the
defendant carried his burden to prove that the prosecutor exercised the challenged
strike solely for a discriminatory purpose. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. In this final
step, the trial court determines if the prosecutor's "explanation for a peremptory
challenge should be believed." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. An explanation may be
credited, even if it is in fact mistaken. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3.
In determining whether a defendant carried his burden to prove
discriminatory intent, the trial court should "undertake a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Batson, 476 U.S. at
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93; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. Often, however, the trial court's assessment is based
on "little evidence" other than the credibility of the prosecutor. See Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (reaffirming that "[t]he credibility of the
prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis [and]
once that has been settled, there seems nothing left [for.an appellate] court to
review"). Consequently, if a defendant—as Defendant did here— fails to attack the
credibility of an explanation after it has been offered, the trial court may assume that
the defendant concedes the legitimacy of the strike and is abandoning his initial
Batson claim. See Texas Dept. ofComm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,255-56 (1981);
Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comrn. of Utah, 736 P.2d 630,625 (Utah 1987) (both recognizing
that once neutral explanation for alleged discriminatory act provided, party
claiming discriminatory intent must disprove explanation's validity). See also Rudas,
905 F.2d at 41 (recognizing trial court may assume defense counsel acquiesced in
legitimacy of prosecutor's explanation for strike, where counsel failed to actively
seek ruling or other action after explanation was given); Davis v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co., 160 F.3d 1023,1027-28 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting position of Second and
Eighth Circuits that failure to directly challenge neutral explanation waives or
{

abandons Batson claim); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123,1126-27 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same); State v. Washington, 288 S.W.3d 312,316-318 (Mo. App. 2009) (holding that
defendant's failure to challenge prosecutor's explanation ended Batson inquiry and
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<

court not obligated to rule); State v. Jones, 911 P.2d 891, 898 (N.M. App. 1995)
(recognizing that because defendant did not challenge veracity of prosecutor's
explanation, court may "reasonably conclude that Defendant did not carry his
burden of proof" under Batson). See also State v. Owen, 935 P.2d 183,196 (Idaho App.
1997) (recognizing defendant waived pretext claim where he failed to attack
prosecutor's explanation in trial court).
C. Defendant fails to establish a substantive Batson violation.
The trial court did not explicitly deny Defendant's Batson objection or any
specific findings. Although trial courts should be explicit when ruling, in this case,
the facts are so simple and the legitimacy of the strike so apparent that any explicit
ruling would be minimal at best.
Chau, a Utah native of apparent Asian ancestry, was stricken from the venire
by the prosecutor's third peremptory strike. Defense counsel then passed the jury
for cause, but indicated that he would like to raise a Batson objection at some point.
Without objection, the court delayed argument on the objection and instead swore
the jury and dismissed Chau and the remainder of the venire. When the objection
was finally argued, defense counsel did not claim that the prosecutor had
intentionally discriminated in striking Chau, but claimed that because Chau was a
minority and counsel could not discern an apparent reason for the strike, the
prosecutor needed to explain it. The prosecutor responded that she noticed that
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Chau had looked at her "funny" several times, but that she had planned on leaving
him on the jury until she observed him not paying attention when the court was
reading to the venire. The prosecutor further described what she had observed:
Chau "kept putting his head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when
someone doesn't want to pay attention." See Statement of tire Case at 6.
After this explanation, the court asked defense counsel if there was
"[a]nything else that we need to put on the record?" Defense counsel did not
request that the court take any further action, but opined that the prosecutor's
explanation was not "sufficient," because other reasons might explain Chau's
reactions:
[Ijt's hard for somebody to tell if somebody is paying attention. People
have different ways of paying attention and this is a smaller room
(inaudible) reading to them or talking to them and so that fact that
someone is looking around or something, I don't think is necessarily
they're not paying attention.
R224:34. The court then allowed trial to continue with the jury previously selected
and approved by the parties. See Statement of the Case at 7.
Defense counsel's response did not deny the prosecutor's observations, but
claimed that the uncontested behavior might not be the result of inattentiveness.
Given the prosecutor's explanation and counsel's response, it is implicit that the
court found that no discriminatory intent had been established. This is especially
true where defense counsel's lack of responsive challenge suggested that counsel
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recognized the legitimacy of the prosecutor's explanation, even if counsel disagreed
with the prosecutor's inference; or suggested that counsel was abandoning the
Baison claim after hearing the prosecutor's explanation. See cases cited, supra, at 3435.
For the first time on appeal, Defendant contends that the prosecutor's
explanation could not be credited, because it was inherently racial. See Br.Aplt. at
15-17. He also claims, for the first time, that all demeanor-based explanations must
be corroborated on the record. Id. at 25 & 29. Because these claims were not raised
below, they should be summarily rejected. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, \ 45,114
P.3d 551. In any case, they lack merit.
In support of the first argument, Defendant cites to an article discussing
possible mistaken impressions that may arise from cultural differences. See Br.Aplt.
at 15-19. The article states that Asians are culturally conditioned to avoid eye
contact as a sign of respect, which non-Asians may misinterpret as inattentiveness.
Id. at 16-17. Defendant claims this proves that the prosecutor's explanation was
racially based.

Id.

To the contrary, it supports the reasonableness of the

prosecutor's interpretation of Chau's reactions, even if that interpretation might not
in fact be true. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3. Notably, Defendant's
argument is itself stereotypical, in that he presumes that if Chau was of Asian
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ancestry, he was necessarily exhibiting a cultural " Asian" response in putting his
head down. But Chau was born and raised in Utah.
Defendant's second argument similarly lacks merit. Defendant claims that
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), precludes crediting a demeanor-based
explanation unless it is corroborated on the record and a specific finding entered.
See Br.Aplt. at 29-30. Defendant overreads Snyder. The Court in Snyder would have
credited the demeanor-based explanation, if it had been clear that the trial court had
credited it. 552 U.S. at 477. The difficulty was that the prosecutor offered two
explanations — one demeanor-based and one not—that were both actively contested
by defense counsel, but neither of which was explicitly credited by the trial court.
Id. at 478-81. After the Snyder Court found that the non-demeanor explanation was
negated by the record and rejected it as a pretext, the Court could not affirm based
on the remaining demeanor-based explanation without knowing if the trial court
had credited it. Id. at 482,485.
The narrowness of Snyder's holding was subsequently recognized in Thaler
v.Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171,1174-75 (2010), a case Defendant fails to acknowledge. In
Thaler, the Court concluded that no corroboration was necessary to credit a
demeanor-based explanation, because the prosecutor's credibility alone was
sufficient. Id. at 1175. Although many cases caution trial courts to carefully assess a
proffered demeanor-based explanation to ensure that it is not a subterfuge for
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discrimination, these same decisions recognize that, on appeal, the trial court's
credibility assessment is unassailable absent clear error.7 See, e.g., Johnson, 4 F.3d at
913 (cautioning trial courts to carefully scrutinize demeanor-based explanations, but
recognizing that trial courts' assessments will be upheld unless "clearly erroneous");
United States v.Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393,395 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).
In any case, defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's observation of
Chau. Counsel claimed only that the inference the prosecutor drew from this
observation—that Chau was inattentive — was not the only inference possible. See
Statement of the Case at 7. Batson, however, does not require that the prosecutor's
inference be the only possible inference, or even a correct inference.

See

Higginbotham, 971 P.2d at 549 n.3. Batson requires only that prosecutor's explanation
be creditable, either standing alone or based on the prosecutor's own credibility.
Thaler, 130 S. Ct. at 1175. Because defense counsel did not challenge either the
credibility of the prosecutor or the inherent legitimacy of the explanation, the trial

7

Defendant also relies on Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2003), for the
proposition that corroboration is required for a demeanor-based explanation before
it may be credited. See Br.Aplt. at 21-23. Dorsey, however, predates Thaler. More
significantly, Dorsey7s rule applies only if the defendant challenged the "factual basis
for the explanation." Dorsey, 868 So.2d at 1196. If the explanation is not challenged,
the demeanor-based explanation is presumed "genuine." Id. at 1199. Accord Harriell
v. State, 29 So.3d 372,374 (Fla. App. 2010). See also Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d
644, 648 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing explanation based on described physical
behavior is more easily credited than vague assertions, such as "I just got a feeling").
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court could permissibly assume that Defendant was conceding the point or
otherwise abandoning his original objection. See cases, supra, at 34-35. This is
especially true where despite the court asking counsel if it needed to do "anything
else on the record/' counsel did not request an explicit ruling or findings. See id.
Moreover, contrary to defense counsel's assertion, the issue to be resolved in
the third step of the Batson analysis is not whether the prosecutor produced a
"sufficient" explanation, but whether Defendant carried his burden to prove that the
prosecutor acted with actual discriminatory intent. See cases, supra, at 24 & 33-35.
Here, Defendant's prima facie showing was so weak—a mere assertion that Chau
was a minority and, consequently, the strike needed to be explained — that even if
the prosecutor had produced no explanation, the trial court could still have
legitimately found that Defendant failed to prove purposeful discrimination. Cf.
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 n.6 (recognizing that explanation or lack of explanation is
but one factor to be considered in ultimately ruling).
In sum, whatever alleged procedural defects might exist in this case, no
violation of equal protection in fact occurred. Defendant, therefore, has not
established that if the alleged procedural defense had not occurred, his Batson
would have been successful.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted January ^^-2012.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

&v^
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; OCTOBER 28, 200 9
JUDGE TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
District Court.

Good morning.

My name is Terry Christiansen, I'll be the

judge presiding in this case.
start.

Welcome to Third

I'm sorry to get such a slow

Normally we have 90 plus percent of jurors that

appear but today we had nine out of 30 that didn't show up so
we've been waiting hoping we'd have enough jurors to proceed
and hopefully we will.
. This is the matter of State of Utah vs. Antoine
Darnell Harris.

It is a criminal case.

The case number is

081400099.
Is the State ready to proceed, Ms. Serassio?
MS. SERASSIO:
THE COURT:
McCaughey?

Yes, Your Honor.

Is the defense ready to proceed, Mr.

.

MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:

I am.'

What I'm going to do is have each of

you stand, raise your right hand, I'll have my clerk swear
you in as prospective jurors.
(Prospective jurors sworn)
/THE COURT: Be seated.

I'm going to ask just a few
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general questions to make sure you all qualify as jurors.
1 Are each of you citizens of the United States and over the
age of 18?

If you are not, please raise your hand.. The

recc rd will reflect that no hands are raised.
Do each of you read, speak, and understand the
Engl ish language?
hand

If you do not again r please raise your

The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
Are eachL of you residents of Salt Lake County at

the present time?

If you are not, please raise you hand.

The record will re.fleet that no hands are raised.
Do each of you consider yourself to be of sound
mind , body and discretion?

If you have any concerns in those

areas, again, please raise your hand.

The record will

reflect that no hands are raised.
Have any of you been convicted of a felony or
malfeasance in office?

If so, please raise your hand.

The

record will reflect that no hands are raised.
And finally, are any of you in the active military
service at the present time?

If so, please raise your hand.

The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
Both counsel stipulate as to the general
qualifications and competence of the panel?
MS. SERASSIO:

Ms. Serassio?

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

We do, Your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

We're going to start with

2

Mr. Johnson.

3

should - yeah, just go through that list and tell us a little

4

bit about yourself.

5

I'm going to have you stand.

MR. JOHNSON:

I think you

Okay, my name is Ralph Johnson.

My

6

age is 54 and I've gone through high school, graduated high

7

school.

8

married.

9

house - homemaker.

My occupation is (inaudible) technician.

I am

My spouse's name is Brenda and her occupation is a
I live in Sandy and I've lived in Salt

10

Lake County all my life and number of children, I have two.

11

My son is 26 and my daughter is 35.

12

THE COURT:

13

Next is Ms. Ritter.

14

MS. RITTER:

15

Thank you, sir.

My name is Jane Ritter.

My age is 80.

I have been educated in Ohio, high school, attended Ohio

16 I State University.

I'm a retired travel agent.

I am a widow.

17

Spouse name and occupation doesn't seen particularly

18

relevant.

19

I am a resident of the area.

20

probably 30 years.

21

ages start at 58 and decrease from there to 50.

22

close enough?

However, my spouse was a member of the military.

I have five children, one is dead.

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. RITTER:

25

microphone.

I've lived in Salt Lake County

That's close enough.

Is that

Thank you.

And also, would you turn up the

I don't hear real well.
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Their

THE COURT:

I don't know that we can turn it up but

we'll do the best we can.
MS. RITTER:

Thank you.

THE COURT:
MR. CHOW:

All right.

Mr. Chow.

My name is (inaudible) Chow.

I'm 27.

I

graduated high school. I'm still going to school up at the U.
Occupation is still student.
Lake area.

I'm single.

I live in the Salt

I was actually born and raised in Salt Lake so

I've lived here all my life and I have no kids.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Bunting.
MS. BUNTING:
years old.
college

My name is Lamoy Bunting.

I'm 78

I graduated from high school and one year of

I am a homemaker.

I am married.

My husband

retired. Robert is my husband's name and he worked for US
West.

I live in Midvale and have lived in the county a good

portion of my life.

I have four daughters, oldest one 55 on

down to the youngest at 42.
THE COURT:

Thank you, ma'am.

Next is Ms. Price.
MS. PRICE:
old.

My name is Heather Price.

I have some college.

I work for an insurance company.

I am married to Thomas Price.
of Utah in the kitchen.
there my entire life.

I'm 28 years

He works up as the University

I live in Murray and have lived
I have one son and he's 12.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Merkley.
MR. MERKLEY:
years old.

My name is Robert Merkley.

I have some college education.

I'm 50

I'm a business

owner of an engineering, structural engineering company.
am married.
homemaker.

My spouse's name is Jennifer Merkley.
I live in Holladay.

County for 2 9 years.

I

She is a

I have resided in Salt Lake

We have four children ranging from 2 8

years of age to 14.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Fulmer.
MR. FULLMER:

My name is Jason Fullmer.

have a bachelor's degree.
engineer.

I'm 33. I

My occupation is software

I'm married to Andrea and she stays at home.

I

live in West Jordan and I've been in Salt Lake County my
whole life and I have three children, ages nine, seven

and

five.
THE COURT:

Thank you.'

Let's go to the top row.

We'll start with Mr.

Ludlow.
MR. LUDLOW:
old.

My name is Jason Ludlow.

I work in construction.

education.

I'm 4 0 years

I have a little bit of college

I'm single. I've lived in Salt Lake County my

whole life and I have no kids.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
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Next is Mr. Maylen.
MR. MAYLEN:

My name is Kent Maylen.

I've attended UTC and the University of Utah.
frame builder. I'm single.

I'm age 56.
I'm a custom

I've lived in Salt Lake County

most of my life and I have a daughter aged 35.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next is Ms. Van Rosendahl.
MS. VAN ROSENDAHL:
Rosendahl.

I'm 25.

My name is Kathryn Van

I have my associates, I'm working on my

bachelor's. I'm a legal assistant and a waitress, single.

I

live in Sugarhouse and I've lived there all 25 years and I
have no kids.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, where do you work as a legal

assistant?
MS. VANROSENDAHL:

Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall,

McCarthy.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Norman.
MR. NORMAN:

I'm - go by Bret Norman.

I'm 54.

I

had a year of technical college but I'm a Wonder Bread
salesman and have been for about 30 years; married to a
wonderful girl named Tina and she's a secretary.
Glendale and I've been in Utah for about 40 years.
one son whose 36.
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.
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I live in
I have

Next is Mr. Carpenter.
MR. CARPENTER:
70.

My name is David Carpenter.

I have a graduate degree.

agent from Delta Airlines.

I am retired customer service

I am single.

in Salt Lake County for 23 years.
THE COURT:

I am

I have been living

I have no children.

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Perry.
MR. PERRY:
old.

My name is Jeff Perry.

I am 33 years

I have roughly three years of college.

I am in sales

for a snowboarding shop.
Breanna.

I am married to a girl named

Her occupation is flight attendant for Sky West

Airlines.

I live kind of in that Millcreek/Murray/South Salt

Lake area.

I've been in Utah for about 13 years in Salt Lake

off and on for that time, no children.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH:

My name is Sean Smith - sorry my voice

is giving out.
THE COURT:

You're fine.

MR. SMITH:

I'm 22.

attended college.
Sugarhouse.

I graduated high school and .

I'm an employee, I'm single.

I've lived here for three years.

I live in
I have no

children.
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir. .

All right.

Let's so to the back of the courtroom

and we'll start with Mr. Berg.
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MR. BERG:

My name is Steven Berg/ I'm'47.

a bachelor's in (inaudible) technology.

I have

I am married.

wife's name is Stacey and she's a medical assistant.

My

I

reside in Riverton area, lived in Salt Lake County 20 years.
I have two children, a 23 year old daughter and 19 year old
son.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. CAMPBELL:

My name is David Campbell.

is 81, four years of college.
from which I'm retired.
married.

Next is Mr. Campbell.
My age

I have a manufacturing firm

My son is now running that.

My wife's name is Mary Elizabeth.

area for 40 some odd years.

I'm

I've been in the

I have seven children, 24

grandchildren, and 14 great grandchildren.
THE COURT:

Good for you.

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Stevenson.
MR. STEVENSON:
years old.

I'm Justin Stevenson.

I am 29

I graduated from the University of Utah.

manage bank owned properties right now.

I

I am single and I've

lived in Sugarhouse for about three years now and I have no
kids

.

.

.

-

•

•

•

•

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Next Mr. Brown.
MR. BROWN:
old.

My name is Richard Brown.

I have a 4-year degree.

divorced.

I'm 55 years

I'm a registered nurse.

I'm a registered nurse.

I'm

I've been in the area for
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18 years.

I have one child, 24 years old.
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

Next is Mr. Cressor.
MR. CRESSOR:

My name is Chad Cressor.

I'm 31.

I

have a high school diploma. I work for a manufacturing
company.

I'm married to Misha Cressor.

title company.

She works for a

I'm a resident of Sandy for nine years.

I

have two children 11 and 4.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Day?
MR. DAY:
age.

My name is James Day.

I am 60 years of

I hold a bachelor's and master's degree from the

University of Utah.
of Utah.

I'm a registered architect in the State

I'm married to Kathryn Day.

She is a homemaker.

We live in Sandy and we've lived in Salt Lake County for the
last 18 years.
California.

Prior to that we were in Pasadena,

I have four children and one grandchild.

THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

And finally, Mr. Nielsen?
MR. NIELSEN:
49 years old.
BS degree.
business.

Yeah, my name is Pete Nielsen.

I'm

I graduated from the University of Utah with a

Currently I own a residential housecleaning
I'm not married.

Currently I live in Riverton.

Lived in Salt Lake County most of my life.
THE COURT:

No kids.

Thank you.
9
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All right.

I've going to read the salient part of

the information which is the charging document in this case.
It read as follows:
"State of Utah vs. Antoine Darnell Harris.

The

undersigned, Detective Ann Valencia, Taylorsville City Police
Department upon written affidavit states on information and
belief that the defendant committed the crimes of Count 1,
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony at 125 West
Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or
about December 18, 2007 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 103, Utah Code, in that the defendant, Antoine
Darnell Harris, a party to the offense, did assault Sarah
Michel as defined in Utah Code 76-5-102 and used other means
or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury."
Count 2 is Assault, Domestic Violence, a Class B
Misdemeanor Felony, at 1275 West Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah on or about December 18, 2007 in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102 and Title 77,
Chapter 37, Section 1 of the Utah Code, in that the
defendant, Antoine Darnell Harris, a party to the offense did
assault another with unlawful force or violence to do bodily
injury, then threatened accompanied by a show of immediate
show force or violence to do bodily injury or did commit an
act with unlawful force or violence that caused bodily injury
and furthermore, the defendant and the victim were co10
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habitants."
To those two counts the defendant has entered pleas
of. not guilty.
This case should be completed today.

I would

anticipate that the evidence should be finished sometime midafternoon and we would read the jury instructions, do closing
arguments and hopefully you'd have it by mid to late
afternoon for your deliberations.

Are there any of you

because of pressing family or business matters cannot devote
your full time and attention to this case if you were
selected to serve on the jury?

If any of you could not

devote your full time and attention, please raise your hand.
The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
I know that Mr. Ritter indicated that she hearing
issues. Are there any others that have any physical ailments
that would prevent you from serving on the jury?

These could

be things such as a recent surgery, back problems, eye
problems, hearing problems.

Anyone other that Ms. Ritter?

If so, please raise your hand.

The record will reflect that

no hands are raised.
Ms. Ritter have you been able to hear me okay?
MS. RITTER:
THE COURT:

I can hear you pretty well.
If you were selected on the jury in

this case and I had you sit in the seat closest to the
witness box, do you think you'd be able to hear okay?
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MS. RITTER:
THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

And ma' am, if you are

sele cted and you have a problem hearing, jus t raise your hand

and don't be bashful, just say can you speak up and we'll
have them speak up.

Okay?

Thank you ma' am.

MS. RITTER: Thank you for your consideration.
• THE COURT: No problem.

All right.

If you arei selectee1 to be on the jury,

you need to understand that the Court is to ]preside and see
that the rules of law and the evidence are c omplied with and
to instruct you on th e law applicable to this case.

Are

there any of you who would not k>e willing[ to accept the law
as given to you by the Court regardless of what you believe
the law is or ought to be?

If you could not accept the

statements of law given to you by the Court, please raise
your hand.

The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
Do you any of you know anything about this case

other than having simply listened to the information being
read?

If so, please raise your hand.

The record will

reflect that no hands are raised.
Ms. Serassio, if you'd stand, identify yourself and
any witnesses you anticipate calling today.
MS. SERASSIO:

Thank you, Your Honor.

My name is Melanie Serassio.

I am a Deputy

District Attorney with the Salt Lake County District
12
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Attorney's Office.

Witnesses that I have present today are

Officer Valencia from Taylorsville Police Department, Officer
Cooper from Taylorsville Police Department, Sarah Michel is a
witness in this case.
testify today.
Center.

I also have Dr. Lori Frasier coming to

She works with the Primary Children's Medical

There are two other people involved in this case who

will not be present to testify today but I want to identify
them so that you know them, Michael Eckhart and Amber Wardle.
THE COURT:

Do any of you know Ms. Serassio or the

witnesses she has identified?

If so, please raise your hand?

The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
Mr. McCaughey, if you'd stand and identify
yourself, your client, and any witnesses you anticipate
calling today.
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Your Honor, I am Steve McCaughey

and I practice law here in Salt Lake.

Antoine Harris is my

client and he will be the only witness we anticipate.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mcaughey or Mr. Harris?

Do any of you know Mr.

If so, please raise your hand.

Again the record will reflect that no hands are raised.
Have any of you served on a jury before?
please raise your hand.

If so,

All right, let's start on the first

row with Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson, how long ago and what type of case?
MR. JOHNSON:

It was probably about 15 years ago
13
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1

and it was a drug related (inaudible).

2

THE COURT:

3

the case, guilty or not guilty?

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

MR. MCCAUGHEY: What kind of case was it?

6

THE COURT:

7

Anyone else in the first row?

8

MR. LUDLOW:

THE COURT:

MR. LUDLOW:

14

THE COURT:

MR. BROWN:

And do you remember the verdict in the

Guilty.
Any else in the top row?

All right.

Yes, it was a DUI case about five years

ago.

18
19

It was probably about 15 years ago.

And then the back, I know we had Mr. Brown.

16
17

All right, the back

case?

13

15

It was a drug case.

It was a child abuse case.

11
12

It was not guilty.

row, Mr. Ludlow.

9
10

Do you remember what the verdict was in

THE COURT: And do you remember the verdict in the
case?

20

MR. BROWN:

It was guilty.

21

THE COURT:

Anyone else in the back row?

22

Day - I'm sorry, Mr. Cressor.

23

MR. DAY:

24

THE COURT: Oh, Day, okay.

25

MR. DAY:

It's Mr.

Mr. Day.

It was a case in this court about two or
14
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three years ago.

I do not recall the charges or anything.

I

recollect I believe the verdict was guilty.
THE COURT:

Anyone else that has served on a jury?

Those of you that have answered in the affirmative, do you
believe that you could be fair and impartial in this case and
simply base the evidence - or base your decision on the
evidence presented in this case and this case alone?

If any

of you would have difficulty being fair and impartial based
on prior jury service, please raise your hand.

The record

will reflect that no hands are raised.
It is the duty of the Judge, not the jury to
determine punishment in the event the defendant is found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Are there any of you who

could not set aside the issue of punishment in your
deliberations and base your decision of guilt or innocens'e
solely on the facts presented?

If any of your would let the

issue of punishment affect your deliberation, please raise
your hand.

Again, the record will reflect that no hands are

raised.
Have any of you formed an opinion as to the guilt
or innocense of Mr. Harris or which party should prevail in
this case?

If so, please raise your hand.

The record will

reflect that no hands are raised.
Have any of you been charged with the crime of
assault, either simple assault or aggravated assault?

If so,
15
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1

please raise your hand.

2

hands are raised.

3

The record will reflect that no

Do any of you have any close family members that

4

have been charged with a crime of assault or aggravated

5

assault?

6

Ms. Price, and who is it that was charged?

If so, please raise your hand.

We've got a couple.

7

MS. PRICE:

My father was.

8

THE COURT:

And how long ago was that?

9

MS. PRICE:

It was a number of years ago.

10

know how long.

11

ago.

12

He's deceased.

THE COURT:

I don't

He died a couple of months

The fact that your father was charged

13

with a similar offense, would that cause you any concern

14

about your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?

15

MS. PRICE:

No.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

here?

Anyone else?

I saw some other hands.

Over

Mr. Day.

MR. DAY:

I have a daughter that was charged with

domestic violence approximately two years ago.
THE COURT:

And would that fact have any bearing on

your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?
• • MR. DAY:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
All right.

Anyone else who has had a

24

close family member that was charged with assault or

25

aggravated assault?

The record will reflect that no hands
16
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1

are raised.

2

Have any of you been the victim of an assault,

3

either domestic violence related or non-domestic violence?

4

If so, please raise your hand.

5

All right.

Ms. Price, we'll start with you.

MS. PRICE:

My ex-husband, five years ago.

How

6

long ago?

7

.

8

(inaudible) and get a restraining order against him but I

9

never did.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

It was

The fact that you have been

11

the victim of an assault and this case does involve issues of

12

assault, would that give you some concern about your ability

13

to be fair and impartial?

•14

-

15
16

question.

17

Price.

18
19
20

MS. PRICE:

It kind of would, yeah.

THE COURT:

Okay, and that's why we ask the

So I appreciate your candor.

All right.
the jury box.

Thank you, Ms.

We also have another hand I believe in

That's Mr. Perry.

MR. PERRY:

I was car-jacked and assaulted in

21 I Minneapolis about 15 years, no, it would been 15 years ago.
22

THE COURT:

All right.

This case will be a lot

23

different than that.

24

Would the fact that were a victim however of assault, would

25

that give you any concern about your ability to be fair and

This involves a domestic situation.

17
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impartial?
MR. PERRY:

No.

THE COURT:

Anyone else in the jury box?

right, let's go to the back of the room.
the victim of assault?

All

Anyone that's been

The record will reflect that no hands

are raised.
Do any.of you have any close family members that
have been the victim of an assault?
hand.

If so, please raise your

All right, that's Ms. Ritter.
MS. RITTER:
THE COURT:
MS. RITTER:
THE COURT:

My daughter.
And how long ago was that?
Three days ago.
Would that you concern about your

ability to be fair and impartial?
MS. RITTER:
THE COURT:

I hope not.
I know these are hard things to look

into your mind and try to anticipate what the evidence would
be.

The purpose of this voir dire selection process is to

get jurors that can be completely fair and impartial.

I know

that it's difficult to kind of separate what happens in your
private life when you come into court and sit on a jury but
if you have any concern that, for example, your daughter's
situation, you might relate that to this situation and
somehow it would affect your decision then it's better that
you not serve on this case and serve on another one.

With
18
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that in mind, do you have any concerns about your ability to
be fair and impartial?
MS. RITTER:

I think I could be fair.

THE COURT:

Any question in your mind?

MS. RITTER:

Yeah, there is, there has to be.

THE COURT:

And that's why we ask the question and

I appreciate your candor.
Anyone else?
MR. BERG:

All right.

That's Mr. Berg.

My daughter while she was in high school

(inaudible) assault from (inaudible).
. THE COURT:
MR. BERG:

And how long ago was that?
(Inaudible).

THE COURT:

Would that situation have any bearing

on your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?
MR. BERG:

No.

THE COURT:

Anyone else whose had a family member

that's been the victim of an assault situation.
• Mr. Day?
MR. DAY:

.
Same one.

. THE COURT:

And that would have no bearing?

MR. DAY: No..
THE COURT:

All right.

Obviously Ms. Serassio has

identified to police officers who will testify.

The law and

direction from the Court is that you should consider the
testimony of a law enforcement the same as you would consider
19
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the testimony of any other witness.

In other words, you

should give the testimony of a peace officer no greater or
lesser weight simply because of the position that they hold.
You should consider their testimony the same as you would the
testimony of any other witness.
teacher, a doctor, a salesman.
matter.

It could be a housewife, a
It just simply doesn't

You have to judge their testimony as you would any.

other witness.
Obviously sometimes in people's experiences they
have had either negative or positive experience with law
enforcement officers to the point that they would give either
greater or lesser weight to their testimony.

Do any of you

feel that because of your experiences you would give either
greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a witness simply
because they hold the position of a peace officer?
please raise your hand.

If so,

The record will reflect that no

hands are raised.
A couple of general questions.

If you were a •

party, either the State of Utah or Mr. Harris, would you be
fully satisfied to have your case tried by a person of your
present attitude, and frame of mind toward the case and that
can be for any reason, you don't need to say it in front of
everyone else.

But is there anyone that has concerns in that

area about if you were the State or the defendant about
having your case tried by someone of your present attitude
20
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and frame of mind?
raise your hand.

If you would have those concerns, please
The record will reflect that no hands are

raised.
Do any of you have any personal considerations or
concerns that may interfere with your ability to objectively
sit and hear the evidence to be presented or to fairly and
impartially consider the evidence, deliberate and render a
verdict in this case?

If you have any personal .

considerations or concerns, again, we can discuss those at
the bench, but if you have those, please raise your hand.
The record will reflect that no hands are raised.
If you are selected to serve on this jury you will
be called to sit in judgment of Mr. Harris.

There is an old

adage in Christian Law and Christianity and in the Bible that
says something to the effect, judge not that ye be not
judged.

In this case you will take an oath to sit in

judgment if you are selected on the jury.

Are there any of

your who would be uncomfortable and feel that you simply
could not sit in judgment if called to serve on this jury?
If so, please raise your hand.

The record will reflect that

no hands are raised.
Counsel, please approach.
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:
THE COURT:

Any questions I need to ask

(inaudible)?
21
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MR. (?):

(Inaudible).

THE COURT:

Obviously Ms. Price and Ms. Ritter.

Anybody else?
MR. (?) : Mr. Berg (inaudible) ask him questions
[inaudible].
THE COURT:

He said it was when she was in high

school and it was just a boyfriend/girlfriend
MR. (?):

(inaudible).

(Inaudible).

THE COURT:

I'll strike Ritter and Price.

Let me

do that right now and (inaudible).
MR. (?):. (Inaudible).
(End of sidebar)
THE COURT:
dire.

All right.

That concludes the voir

I'm going to have the attorneys exercise their

peremptory challenges.
While they're doing so,-rather than just simply
have you do nothing, I came across an article many, many
years ago. It's by Barbara Holland, j S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S
WiSlW^

I'll read you excerpts from that

article while we're waiting for the attorneys to exercise
their challenges.
It read as follows:

"When law and order began, the

only court was the head of the family and father knew best.
His word was the law and there was no appeal.

If papa was a

bully, maybe momma could pack up the kids and move to a .
'
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different family or spike his soup with leaves and berries
her mother had told her about.

In any case, what happened in

the family was nobody's business but the family's.

Presently

people developed agricultural and settled down, clustering
together in groups of families.

We acquired garden plots and

portable private property and controversy as we now know it
was born.

Old (inaudible) still decided family matters but

coping with inner familiar strife called for group
arbitration to prevent a homicidal free-for-all.
gave birth to law.
law from the facts.

Controversy

Rome refined the system and separated the
A magistrate to find the dispute, cited

the law and referred the problem to citizen (inaudible), a
fellow of some standing who called in a few associates to
help.

They listened to the speeches, weighed the evidence

and pronounced sentence.
Tribunal.

This was more orderly than a'

The Romans were passionately fond of order and

wrote down all their laws in books.

They were also fond of a

good public spectacle and a convicted criminal could opt for
the arena and entertain citizens by duking it out with other
criminals or prisoners of war.

A talented gladiator only got

to live but he could wind up as a popular sports hero
surrounded by pretty ladies.

The Romans loved a winner

regardless of his criminal record.
After Rome fell apart it's orderly laws
deteriorated to gibberish and threatened the possible
23
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legendary King Arthur had to send his possible legendary
knights out to ride around righting wrongs and rescuing
maidens from sexual harassment, a far from comprehensive
judicial system.

There were still trials though with an

ordeal serving as jury. '. Great faith has been placed in trial
by ordeal all the way from the Old Testament to the
Australian Outback.

The idea is that something out there

knows whose guilty and will point to him if given the chance.
The chance usually involves fire or water or poison.

Poison

is written' in the Bible and was popular in Africa and India
for trials by ordeal.

Those who survived it all, though

likely to be ill were considered to be innocent.
The Saxons developed a variation called
(inaudible), a morsel of something that would show if you're
guilty, perhaps their throats were dry with apprehension and
Godwin, Earl of Kent is said to have choked on his.

Under

Saxon law if you could carry several pounds of glowing, red,
hot iron in your bare hands for nine steps or walk barefoot
over nine red hot plowshares without getting any blisters,
you were not guilty.
Similar proof was accepted in Hindu and Scandinavia
law.

In Britain, Africa and parts of Asia plunging your arm

into boiling water, oil, or lead without the usual results
proved your innocense.

Water was also knowledgeable stuff.

The innocent sank, the guilty floated and could be fished out
24
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and dealt with.

This was the customary method of identifying

witches who were cross tied, thumb to toe before being thrown
in.

True witches refused to drown and were dried off and

burned at the stake.

Alongside this unidentified jurist

prudence, the Saxons were actually working with the human
jury system but it was available only to the honest.

If your

neighbors knew you for a liar or you had perjured yourself in
the past or presumably if you were a stranger just passing
through, you weren't oath worthy and went directly to the
red, hot iron or the drowning pond.

But if you were a person

of honesty in your district and were accused of a crime you
swore by the Lord "I am guiltless in both deed and counsel,
of the charge of which

y r

x

accuses me," and that was that.

However, if you were accused by

a group, you had to parry

with a group of your own called compergators.

You asked 11

thanes, freeholders to join you and swear your honesty in the
matter.

If you couldn't round up 11 who believed you, you

took off your shoes for the hot plowshares.
In those days, honesty was. the best policy.
Honesty and a loyal group of bribable drinking buddies.
(Inaudible) noticed this flaw provided for a group of 12
senior thanes to investigate an act as an accusatory jury.
Eight votes could convict.
matter.

Justice was still a neighborhood

Everyone was suppose to know everyone else and have

some firsthand knowledge of what happened.
25
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Rather recently we've turned this concept on its
head and juries are suppose to know nothing at all before
they sit down in the box, to be but empty vessels into which
the liquor of admissible evidence is poured.

In inflammatory

cases a trial even gets moved to another area to insure jury
indifference.
When William the Conqueror took over England in
1066 he left the Saxon system in place and added some Norman
forces like trial by combat.

Combat was a judicial

entertainment similar to the gladiatorial in which right was
thought to make might.

Whoever was right would win.

The

accuser had to do battle with the accused causing the small
and frail to think twice before complaining.

But if you were

no good at fighting you could hire someone to fight for you.
The man with the fiercest hired help won rather like hiring
the most expensive lawyer today.
Ordeals fell into disuse in the 13th century but
the right to trial by combat stayed on the books until
Ashford vs. Thornton in 1819.
more complicated.

By Norman times, laws were

So professionals called justice seers were

sent around to keep an eye on the courts and rules of
evidence rather like judges.

They knew more about the law

and less about what happened than the jurors did.
We were told in school that jury trials sprang
newborn from the Magna Carta, but juries were around before
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1215.

The Magna Carta just guaranteed them as a right not to

be ignored by capricious powers like Bad King John.

But some

kings went right on being capricious anyway.
In these enlightened times we merely torch the
neighborhood if we don't like the verdict. But back then,
juries got punished if the authorities didn't like it.

Since

juries were considered witnesses, a wrong vote was considered
perjury.

Acquitting unpopular or possibly treasonous people

got jurors hauled into the star chamber where a group of the
King's dear friends dealt severely with them.

They lost

their goods and chattels and were sent to jail for at least a.
year.

Sometimes their wife and children were thrown out of

their house, the house demolished, the meadows destroyed and
even the trees chopped down.
other than evidence.

A prudent jury weighed factors

It was also the custom for the lawyer

to pay each jurors several guineas or to take them all out to
dinner.
As we limped toward the 21st century, the world
community of nosy neighbors has faded into history and the
problem now is who are these jurors?
them wise men.

Prince Morgan called

Under Edward I, they were to be 12 of the

better men of the bailiwick, under George IV, good and lawful
men.

Except for adulteresses, witches and common scolds,

history doesn't mention women.
invention.

Perhaps they're a recent

It seems to have been so simple then naming our
27
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good, wise, lawful peers.

How do we choose among strangers

not necessarily wise but merely registered to vote?

Once the

blatantly prejudice have been sent packing, both sides take
up the peremptory challenge of turning down jurors for the
way they look, dress, or comb their hair.

The differing

agendas of the prosecution and the defense complicate
matters.
Prosecution lawyer, Jeffrey Tubin says that when he
first came to the bar he was told to avoid men with beards,
too independent and teachers and social workers, too
sympathetic, and aim for the little old Lutheran lady in
pearls, quick to judge and slow to forgive.
For the defense, Clarence Darrow advised not to
take a German, they are bull-headed; rarely take a Swede,
they are stubborn.

Always take an Irishman or- a Jew, they

are the easiest to move to emotional sympathy.

He preferred

old men for their tolerance, but Samuel Lee Woods liked them
young for their still fresh sense of brotherhood and avoided
self-made men, businessmen with close set eyes, writers,
professors and former policemen.
How are we doing?
MS. SERASSIO: We're half done.
THE COURT: Half done?
they get done.

Usually this is about when

You'll just have to wait for a few minutes.

Does anyone have any questions?

I would tell you
28
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that in a felony case, eight of you are called to serve on
the jury.

If this were a capital case involving the death

penalty, it would be 12 of you.

For a Class A Misdemeanor,

six jurors and if it was a Class B Misdemeanor, there would be
four.

So since this is a felony case, eight of you will be

selected to serve on the jury and each attorney gets four
peremptory challenges.

So there will be eight of you that

will be stricken.
And for the record, Mr. McCaughey, you did pass the
jury for cause?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

I think we need to approach for a

minute.
THE COURT:

Okay, would you approach the bench?

MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:

Oh, we do pass for cause, yes. .

And Ms. Serassio, you did pass the jury

for cause?
MS. SERASSIO:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Approach the bench.

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

The concern (inaudible) is Juror

No. 3 is struck by the State (inaudible) ability [inaudible]
she needs to justify [inaudible].
•THE COURT:

All right, do you have a reason for

that?
MS. SERASSIO: Yeah, (inaudible).
29
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that in a felony case, eight of you are called to serve on
the jury.

If this were a capital case involving the death

penalty, it would be 12 of you.

For a Class A Misdemeanor,

six jurors and if it was a Class B Misdemeanor there would be
four.

So since this is a felony case, eight of you will be

selected to serve on the jury and each attorney gets four
peremptory challenges.

So there will be eight of you that

will be stricken.
And for the record, Mr. McCaughey, you did pass the
jury for cause?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

I think we need to approach for a

minute.
THE COURT:

Okay, would you approach the bench?

MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:

Oh, we do pass for cause, yes.

And Ms. Serassio, you did pass the jury

for cause?
MS. SERASSIO:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Approach the bench.

(Whereupon a sidebar was.held as follows:
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

The concern (inaudible) is Juror

No. 3 is struck by the State (inaudible) ability [inaudible]
she needs to justify [inaudible].
• THE COURT:

All right, do you have a reason for

that?
MS. SERASSIO: Yeah, (inaudible).
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THE COURT:

Why don't we put that on the record

during the break?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Okay, I just wanted to inform you

(inaudible).
(End of sidebar)
' THE COURT: All right. I'm going to read the eight
of you who have been selected to serve on the jury.

As I

read your name if you would please stand. Robert Lewis
Merkley, Jason Howard Fullmer, Kathryn Ashley Van Roosendahl,
Delvin Brent Norman, Jeffrey Eugene Perry, Sean Christopher
Smith, David Randall Campbell, and Richard Allen Brown.
Ms. Serassio, is that the jury you have selected?
MS. SERASSIO:
THE COURT:

It is, Your Honor.

Mr. McCaughey?

MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:
where you are.

Those of you that are standing, stay

Those of you that are not standing, thank you

for your appearance today.
jury service.
so choose.

It is, Your Honor.

I am going to release you from

You're welcome to remain as a spectator if you

Otherwise, have the rest of a good day.
(Prospective jurors not selected excused)

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Murphy, if I can get you

to move down a few spaces. Mr. Fullmer, you're next to him,
Ms. VanRoosendahl, I'll have you sit next to Mr. Fullmer and
then Mr. Norman next to Ms. Van Roosendahl.
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And then the back row, Mr. Perry will be at the far
end. Next to Mr. Perry will be Mr. Smith and then Mr.
Campbell and then Mr. Brown.
All right.

Before you get too comfortable, I'll

have you stand and I'll have my clerk swear you in as jurors
in this case.
(Whereupon the jury members were sworn)
THE COURT: All right.
a few minutes.

Just sit down.

in the same order.

Let me just talk to you for
It's important that you sit

It's probably best if you kind of move

closer to the witness box so if you just kind of slide down.
You don't need to do it now, just when you come back and I'm
kind of tall so I like to spread out.
every seat filled.
that's fine.

You don't need to have

If you want to put a seat between you,

Just be as comfortable as you can.

We'll

usually take at least one morning recess which we'll do now,
at least one or two afternoon recesses.
upon witness situations.

Sometimes it's based

If for any reason you feel like you

need a recess, maybe you're just getting a little tired,
maybe there's a telephone call that you need to make, maybe
need to use the restroom facilities, all you have to do is
just raise your hand and say, you know, Judge, can we take a
recess?

I won't ask you why but I want you alert and fresh.

So don't feel at all embarrassed about asking for a recess.
Sometimes I have a tendency to just kind of plow through and
31
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not take recesses when sometimes I think jurors would
appreciate it or attorneys would appreciate a recess.

All

you have to do is just ask and I'll make sure we take one
periodically.
It's important that you not discuss this case among
yourselves or allow others to discuss it with you during the
pendency of the trial.

We'll take a lunch recess.

generally around the noon hour.

It's

I don't like to break into

witness testimony if I think they will be relatively brief.
So if it's about noon and I think we're about done with the
witness, I'll usually allow that witness to finish so they
can leave and we can finish the witness before starting again
in the afternoon.
I'm going to take a recess now, allow you to
telephone anyone; your family, your business, anyone who may
have been expecting you today. Let them know that you're
serving on a jury and again, we do anticipate we'll finish
today.

Any questions from anybody?

All right.

We'll be in

recess for about 10 minutes.
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).
, THE COURT: The record will reflect that the jury
has now left the courtroom.

Mr. McCaughey did ask to

approach the bench on a Bastan Challenge.

I'll you make that

on the record now Mr. McCaughey.
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Your Honor, based on the state's
32
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taking off Juror No. 3, Mr. Chow, who clearly was the only
minority on the jury, as I looked through my questions or
excuse me, my notes on his answers, there's nothing in there
that would indicate any reason to take him off the jury other
than the fact that he was 27 years old and was obvious an
Asian, of the Asian race and so I think the State has to
justify why they took that person off the jury.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. SERASSIO:

Ms. Serassio?

Yes, Your Honor, when I was watching

him during the time that you were reading the story to the
jurors, he was not paying attention.

He kept putting his

head down, he wasn't listening and that concerns me when
someone doesn't want to pay attention.

I also noted in my

notes that he kept looking at me funny and so any time I get
a bad feeling from a juror and if they're not paying
attention, initially I was going to leave him on and then he
just wasn't paying attention.

He has to pay attention during

the jury trial.
I had concerns about (inaudible) Bunting as well
but the defense had struck her.

I didn't know if she would

have any problems with her or anything but she was the
defense struck her as number 4, but she was actually paying
attention and listening to what you had to say and Jonathan
was not paying attention.
THE COURT:

All right and for the record, Mr.•
33
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Harris is not of Asian decent; is that correct, Mr.
McCaughey?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:
So, all right.

That's correct.

Even though obviously he is a minority.

Anything else we need to put on the record?

MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Judge, I guess my response to that

is, it's hard for somebody to tell if somebody is paying
attention.

People have different ways of paying attention

and this is a smaller room (inaudible) reading to them or
talking to them and so the fact that somebody is looking
around or something, I don't think is necessarily they're not
paying attention.

So I don't think that's sufficient, but

just so the record is clear.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

We'll recess

for about 10 minutes.
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
THE COURT:

For the record, you just have the one

jury instruction?
MR. MCCAUGHEY:

Yes.

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)
THE COURT:

All right.

The record will reflect the

jury is back in the courtroom, all counsel and defendant are
present.
Members of the jury, what we're going to do first
34
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2,
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such state.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
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Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

I
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102 (West 2004) Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 (West 2004) Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a),
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
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